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Abstract
Health insurers may use financial incentives to encourage their enrollees to choose preferred providers for medical treatment. 
Empirical evidence whether differences in cost-sharing rates across providers affects patient choice behavior is, especially 
from Europe, limited. This paper examines the effect of a differential deductible to steer patient provider choice in a Dutch 
regional market for varicose veins treatment. Using individual patients’ choice data and information about their out-of-pocket 
payments covering the year of the experiment and 1 year before, we estimate a conditional logit model that explicitly controls 
for pre-existing patient preferences. Our results suggest that in this natural experiment designating preferred providers and 
waiving the deductible for enrollees using these providers significantly influenced patient choice. The average cross-price 
elasticity of demand is found to be 0.02, indicating that patient responsiveness to the cost-sharing differential itself was low. 
Unlike fixed cost-sharing differences, the deductible exemption was conditional on the patient’s other medical expenses 
occurring in the policy year. The differential deductible did, therefore, not result in a financial benefit for patients with annual 
costs exceeding their total deductible.
Keywords Patient channeling · Preferred providers · Tiered networks · Patient choice
JEL Classification I11 · I13 · D12 · C25
Introduction
Managed care insurers that are more successful at chan-
neling patients can negotiate better deals with health care 
providers [7, 19, 26]. A credible threat of losing patient vol-
ume seems to stimulate providers to offer more favorable 
contract terms, such as price discounts and quality improve-
ments, than they otherwise would have offered. To chan-
nel patients to specific providers, insurers may differenti-
ate cost-sharing rates across provider alternatives requiring 
higher out-of-pocket payments for visits to non-preferred 
providers than for visits to preferred providers. There is 
emerging empirical evidence from the US that the use of 
financial incentives affects patient choice behavior (see for 
example [5, 16, 18]). These incentives include differential 
copayments across provider tiers, percentage coinsurance 
rates which automatically tiers providers according to price, 
and reimbursement limits requiring the patient to pay the 
difference between this limit and the insurer–provider nego-
tiated price.
This paper examines a channeling experiment with a 
differential deductible in The Netherlands. In this 1-year 
experiment De Friesland Zorgverzekeraar (DFZ), at that 
time the largest independent regional health insurer in The 
Netherlands, designated preferred providers for two proce-
dures (cataract surgery and varicose veins treatment). It also 
used a financial incentive to encourage their enrollees to 
choose these providers for medical treatment. The insurer 
exempted its enrollees from paying their annual deductible 
when they sought care at a preferred provider. The deduct-
ible exemption, however, was conditional on the enrollee’s 
other medical expenses occurring in the policy year. People 
still had to pay their annual deductible when using other 
medical services than cataract surgery and varicose veins 
treatment. During the experiment, the enrollee’s financial 
benefit when visiting a preferred provider thus depended 
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upon his ex post total medical expenses in the policy year. 
Hence, people had to make a prediction about the ‘price’ 
associated with visiting a non-preferred provider.
To test whether this channeling experiment affected the 
allocation of patients across individual providers, Van der 
Geest and Varkevisser [21] estimated two OLS regression 
models using providers’ patient volume data over a 3-year 
period.1 In this study, it was concluded that in the year of the 
experiment the allocation of cataract patients across individ-
ual providers was not affected by the channeling experiment, 
whereas preferred providers of varicose veins treatment on 
average gained patient volume relative to non-preferred pro-
viders. Both the insurer’s selection of preferred providers in 
terms of joint market share and the design of the financial 
incentive are likely explanations for this result.
As a follow-up study, this paper focuses on the proce-
dure for which the allocation of patients across providers 
was significantly affected. It assesses in more detail how 
responsive patients were to the cost-sharing differential 
between preferred and non-preferred providers of varicose 
veins treatment apart from the insurer’s preferred provider 
label. It contributes to the emerging, but still small body of 
literature examining the effect of differential cost-sharing on 
patient provider choices. Using additionally obtained data 
on each individual patient’s out-of-pocket payment and a 
few patient characteristics, we estimate a conditional logit 
model of patient choice to empirically disentangle the effect 
of the preferred provider label and the financial channeling 
incentive provided. We use choice data covering the year of 
the experiment and 1 year before to control for pre-existing 
patient preferences. The estimated coefficients are then used 
for calculating preferred and non-preferred providers’ aver-
age cross-price elasticity of demand.
The paper is structured as follows. We first briefly sum-
marize the institutional context and the natural experiment. 
Then we describe our empirical methodology, followed by a 
discussion of the data. After this, we present our estimation 
and simulation results. We conclude with a summary and 
discussion of our main findings.
Background
The Netherlands has a system of universal health insurance 
based on regulated competition in the private sector. This 
system adheres closely to Enthoven’s plan of managed com-
petition in health care [4]. All citizens are obliged to buy 
standardized basic health insurance covering the costs of 
all common medical care including primary care, hospital 
services (for up to 1 year), and pharmaceuticals. The pre-
mium for basic health insurance is community-rated. There 
is a risk equalization system in place to reduce insurers’ 
incentives for risk selection. Every adult has a mandatory 
annual deductible that must be met before medical services 
are reimbursed by the insurer (excluding primary care and 
maternity care). Consumers obtain a community-rated dis-
count on their premium if they opt for a voluntary deductible 
(at most 500 euro).
Competing private health insurers are provided with 
financial incentives as well as tools to organize and manage 
acute (curative) care for their enrollees by establishing and 
maintaining provider networks. To increase their bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis providers, health insurers may restrict 
access to a network of providers. Enrollees using out-of-
network providers receive a lower reimbursement rate. Other 
than selective contracting, insurers can designate preferred 
providers within their contracted network, i.e. forming 
a two-tiered provider network. To encourage enrollees to 
choose providers labelled as ‘preferred’ or ‘higher value’ 
they may waive the annual deductible for visiting a preferred 
provider.2
DFZ, then the largest regional health insurer in The Neth-
erlands with a market share of about 65% in the Dutch prov-
ince Friesland (or Frisia),3 used such a differential deductible 
for patient channeling in 2009. It designated three hospitals 
(including the largest hospital in Friesland) and one free-
standing ambulatory surgery center as preferred providers 
for varicose veins treatment because of above average per-
formance in guideline adherence, waiting time and patient 
satisfaction.4 To enrollees it was emphasized that the pre-
ferred providers were carefully selected for reasons of qual-
ity and, therefore, labelled as ‘higher value’. The deductible 
1 The data was obtained from health insurer DFZ. Hence, each pro-
vider’s patient volume is the number of patients with health insurance 
provided by DFZ.
2 For more information about the bargaining position of Dutch health 
insurers in the negotiations with health care providers, see Schut & 
Varkevisser [17].
3 Friesland is a province in the northwest of The Netherlands. Most 
of Friesland is on the mainland, but it also includes four small islands 
which are connected to the mainland by ferry. The total land area 
equals 3349 km2. Friesland has a total population of 646,000 and is 
with a population density of 190 inhabitants per  km2 one of the most 
sparsely populated regions in The Netherlands.
4 Varicose veins are swollen and enlarged veins that are visible 
through the skin and may appear blue or dark purple. They are caused 
by increased blood pressure inside the superficial veins and com-
monly develop in the legs and ankles. Besides being a cosmetic prob-
lem, varicose veins can be very painful. Women are more likely to 
be affected by varicose veins than men. Treatment for varicose veins 
performed by medical specialists requires a referral from a general 
practitioner (GP) and involves both surgical (e.g. vein stripping) and 
nonsurgical approaches (e.g. compression stockings, sclerotherapy 
and laser treatment). The vast majority of patients is treated in an out-
patient setting.
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exemption would concern both the enrollee’s mandatory 
deductible (155 euro in 2009) as well as, when relevant, the 
voluntary deductible (at most 500 euro). The difference in 
cost-sharing between preferred and non-preferred providers 
could, therefore, add up to a maximum of 655 euro. Hospi-
tal-insurer negotiated prices for the treatment of varicose 
veins typically differed from about 700 euros to about 2000 
euros for the more complex treatments and thus in 2009 
exceeded the patient’s deductible.5 However, the deductible 
exemption was conditional on the enrollee’s other medical 
expenses occurring in the year 2009. Enrollees still had to 
pay their annual deductible when using other medical ser-
vices than varicose veins treatment and cataract surgery.6
Empirical methodology
The aim of our study was to assess in detail how responsive 
patients were to the insurer’s preferred provider label and the 
cost-sharing differential between preferred and non-preferred 
providers. We model patient provider choice using a utility 
maximization framework in which the patient chooses the 
provider that is most attractive based on attributes that vary 
across alternative providers.7 To estimate our model we use 
pooled individual patient choice data from 1 year before 
(2008) and during the channeling experiment (2009). This 
allows us to control for unobservable prior preferences for 
providers that were designated as preferred provider by the 
insurer in 2009, as it is very unlikely that patient preferences 
(in terms of trade-offs between provider attributes) changed 
simultaneously with the introduction of the patient channeling 
experiment in these two consecutive years. Since all DFZ 
insured in 2009 were exposed to the financial incentive, we 
are not able to analyze whether the pre-to-post-difference was 
larger for exposed patients than for non-exposed patients. Our 
control group, therefore, necessarily consists of all varicose 
veins patients in 2008 since they were not exposed to any 
channeling incentive. Thus, we compare the probability that 
a given provider would be chosen by patients if that provider 
was selected as a preferred provider in 2009 with the prob-
ability that it was chosen in the year prior to the experiment.
As is standard in the contemporary hospital choice litera-
ture (see for example [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10], we use the random 
utility choice model introduced by McFadden [14]. Assum-
ing the unobserved random components (εij) are indepen-
dently and identically distributed (idd), we estimate the fol-
lowing conditional logit model specification for analyzing 
patient choice:8
where  Choiceij is a dummy variable identifying patient’s 
i choice of hospital j given all J hospitals in his choice set. 
 Posti is a dummy variable equal to 1 if patient i’s varicose 
veins treatment took place in 2009 when the two-tiered pro-
vider network was in place (and 0 if treatment took place in 
2008).  Prefj is a dummy variable indicating whether provider 
j belongs to the group preferred providers. It controls for pre-
existing patient preferences for the providers designated as 
preferred provider by DFZ in 2009. The coefficient on the 
interaction between  Posti and  Prefj represents the change in 
utility from choosing a preferred provider in the year of the 
experiment. This is thus one of the coefficients of our pri-
mary interest while it allows us to test whether the preferred 
provider status affected patient choice behavior. Please note 
that β1Posti will drop out the regression, as it does not vary 
within the choice set.
Through the price component of the utility function, 
we test whether the financial channeling incentive affected 
patient choice behavior. The variable  Priceij is the finan-
cial benefit (in euros) that patient i would miss out when 
visiting a non-preferred provider. Of course, this euro 
amount was equal to zero for all non-preferred providers in 
2008, because at the time there was no financial incentive 
in place yet. However, during the experiment the price of 
non-preferred providers was based on patient’s i expecta-
tion regarding the amount of his total deductible left unused 
in the 2009 policy year. In the absence of more detailed 
(1)
Choiceij = 훽1Posti + 훽2Prefj + 훽3Posti ∗ Prefj
+ 훽
4
Priceij + 훽5Timeij +
n∑
k=1
훾kHkj + 휀ij
5 For confidentiality reasons, DFZ did not provide us with informa-
tion on their negotiated prices.
6 The actual financial benefit of choosing a preferred provider has 
been different among patient groups. Patients with no additional 
medical expenses in 2009 had a higher financial benefit of choosing 
a preferred provider than other patients. Furthermore, enrollees who 
opted for a voluntary deductible in 2009 had a higher potential finan-
cial benefit than enrollees with no voluntary deductible.
7 In The Netherlands, GPs function as gatekeepers for specialized 
medical care but patients are free to choose which provider to visit. 
Based on videotaped Dutch GP-patient consultations, Victoor et  al. 
[24] concluded that many patients visit the provider that is recom-
mended by their GP. In the study period, Dutch GPs did not have a 
(financial) interest to refer patients to particular providers while 
neglecting their preferences. We therefore do not take into account 
potential principal-agent problems. The term patient here thus refers 
to the patient-referring GP pair jointly choosing the most attractive 
provider. Note that the patient’s (potential) financial benefit associ-
ated with the choice of a preferred provider may not be the deciding 
factor.
8 Time subscripts are not included in the model specification, 
because we pooled the data from 2008 to 2009. The variable Posti 
identifies whether an observation is either from before or after the 
start of the channeling experiment.
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information about patients’ total health care consumption, 
we use each patient’s percentage of the total deductible left 
unused in 2008 multiplied by the total deductible amount 
(i.e. sum of mandatory and voluntary deductible) in 2009 as 
a proxy for his expected financial benefit.9 This approach is 
similar to how Brot-Goldberg et al. [2] model a consumer’s 
expected end-of-the-year marginal price. Unfortunately, the 
obtained data do not allow us to control in a meaningful 
way for the fact that patients may have adjusted their expec-
tations during the year of the experiment.10 Note that using 
each patient’s percentage of the deductible left unused in 
the year of the experiment as an alternative would incor-
rectly assume perfect foresight and also result in an endo-
geneity problem.
The variable  Timeij is the minimum driving time from 
the patient i’s home to provider j. The vector H
⋅j represents 
two provider attributes we control for; i.e. provider type 
(general hospital, tertiary hospital or ambulatory surgery 
center) and whether the provider is located in the province 
of Friesland.11 Clinical quality as provider attribute is not 
included in the model as choice determinant because pub-
lic information about it was unavailable during the study 
period. Reliable outcome indicators for varicose veins 
treatment were being developed in The Netherlands at the 
time, but not yet available for patients (and GPs) to com-
pare providers [25]. Note that differences in waiting time 
across providers are implicit part of the model because it 
was one of indicators used by the insurer when selecting the 
preferred providers. The error term (εij) represents the idi-
osyncratic part of patient i’s evaluation of provider j includ-
ing information obtained by word of mouth and possible 
prior experience.
To test whether there is patient heterogeneity in respon-
siveness to the channeling experiment, we also estimate an 
extended version of Eq. [1] where we interact both Posti × 
 Prefj and  Priceij with three patient characteristics: age, gen-
der and social status. For age we construct a dummy vari-
able to define the subgroup of retired people (in 2009 the 
standard retirement age was 65 years) who usually experi-
ence a (substantial) drop in income after retirement.
Data
Data sources
The data for this study come from multiple sources. Most 
importantly, from health insurer DFZ we obtained indi-
vidual claims data for all their varicose veins patients cap-
turing the period January 2008 through December 2009. 
This data include the Diagnosis and Treatment Combina-
tion (DTC) code of the specific varicose veins treatment 
only,12 the date of admission, the provider name and postal 
code, the patient’s gender, age (on date of admission) and 
his residential postal code. For patients admitted in 2009, 
the insurer also provided information on the amount of vol-
untary deductible chosen for the calendar years 2008 and 
2009 as well as the euro amount paid to the insurer of his 
total deductible (i.e. sum of mandatory and any voluntary 
deductible) in 2008 and 2009.13 For the 2009 patient group 
we calculate the percentage left unused of the total deduct-
ible in 2008 to construct our proxy variable for the financial 
channeling incentive.
We used a drive time matrix containing all 4-digit postal 
codes in The Netherlands to include the minimum driving 
time (in minutes) from an individual’s residential postal code 
to each provider.14 Data on type of provider are obtained 
from the web-based Dutch National Atlas of Public Health 
and the website of the Dutch association of tertiary medical 
teaching hospitals. Based on the provider’s postal code, we 
construct the dummy variable whether a provider is located 
in Friesland or not.
Due to privacy concerns, DFZ could not provide any 
detailed patient-level socio-economic information. In addi-
tion to the available individual patient data on age and gen-
der, from The Netherlands Institute for Social Research 
(SCP) we obtained a social status score for each 4-digit 
postal code in 2010. Using factor analysis, SCP derived the 
social status of a 4-digit postal code area from a number of 
characteristics of the people living there: average income 
12 In The Netherlands each patient admitted to a provider of spe-
cialized medical care is categorized into a Diagnosis and Treatment 
Combination (DTC) code, which includes all outpatient and/or inpa-
tient activities and services associated with the patient’s care from the 
initial consultation to the final check-up.
13 For only a very few patients (n = 27) DFZ could not provide us 
with data on out-of-pocket payment and amount of voluntary deduct-
ible in 2008 because they were not enrolled in that year.
14 The drive time matrix also accounts for differences in average 
speed that exist between different road types.
9 For 99.4 percent of the patients in our study sample the total 
deductible in 2009 was the same as in 2008, except for the increase 
of the mandatory deductible imposed by the government (+ 5 euro).
10 Because we cannot track patients across claims related to other 
types of medical care other than varicose veins treatment, it is not 
possible to control for the presence of chronic conditions. Hence, 
we are not able to distinguish chronically ill from non-chronically ill 
patients who likely differed on expectations regarding their medical 
expenses in 2009.
11 Other things being equal, Frisians might prefer regional providers 
because they are generally speaking proud of their own culture and 
identity. As an illustration, Friesland is the only one of the twelve 
provinces of The Netherlands to have, in addition to Dutch, its own 
official language.
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level, the percentage of people having a low income, the per-
centage low educated and the percentage unemployed. The 
higher the score, the higher the social status of the postal 
code area.
Patient study sample and patients’ choice sets 
of providers
For the analysis, we use the obtained claims data to create 
a study sample of varicose veins patients. To prevent a bias 
caused by existing patient–physician relationships we only 
include for each patient the first primary treatment of the 
calendar year.15 In addition, we selected patients living in 
Friesland because the patient channeling experiment was 
primarily aimed at this population. From all DFZ enrollees 
that needed treatment for varicose veins in 2008–2009 as 
much as 85% lived in Friesland. The other 15% were almost 
equally spread across the country.
For some patients the name of the provider visited is 
missing in the data, so we exclude them from the analysis 
(n = 69). We also drop all patients who were treated by a pro-
vider not located in the northern part of the country (n = 28). 
Since this small minority of patients travelled on average 
much longer than other patients (i.e. 119 min compared to 
25 min), it is most likely that either these patients’ starting 
addresses are incorrect or their observed provider choice 
reflects very special preferences or medical needs.
As it is not possible to observe a patient’s true choice set 
in these data, we rely on the aggregated choices of patients 
to identify supposed reasonable options. We presume each 
patient’s choice set to consist of all providers contracted by 
DFZ for varicose veins treatment (located in the northern 
part of the country) that were visited by at least one enrollee 
in each sample year. This results in a uniform choice set for 
each patient including 13 different providers. Consequently, 
an additional small number of patients (n = 78) is excluded, 
because they visited a provider that was outside this choice 
set. In the choice set of 2009 three providers were desig-
nated as preferred provider.16 The location of all providers 
included in the choice set is shown in Fig. 1. More detailed 
information on these providers can be found in the “Appen-
dix” (Table 6).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Our final study sample includes 4252 unique varicose 
veins patients with DFZ insurance during the study period 
2008–2009. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. From 
this table it follows that the 2008 and 2009 patient groups 
are quite similar. Almost 80% of the patients were females 
and patients were on average slightly older than 50 years.17 
The average social status scores of the 2008 and 2009 patient 
group were − 0.54 and − 0.48, respectively, which is below 
the national average score (0.17). On average, patients trav-
elled less than 25 min and almost all patients (95 and 93% 
in 2008 and 2009, respectively) did not leave the Frisian 
province for treatment. About 60% of the patients visited a 
general hospital, while around 35% visited a tertiary hos-
pital. A considerable lower percentage of patients (3–6%) 
obtained care at an ambulatory surgery center. In 2008, the 
three providers designated preferred during the channeling 
experiment jointly performed 39% of the procedures. The 
largest hospital in the region (Medisch Centrum Leeu-
warden) represented 91% of this volume. In 2009, the pre-
ferred providers jointly performed 42% of the procedures. 
In both absolute and relative terms (49 patients and 71%, 
respectively) the freestanding ambulatory center among the 
preferred providers (Braamkliniek) experienced the biggest 
increase in patient volume.
Table 2 presents some additional descriptive statistics of 
the 2009 patient group. The average total deductible—and, 
therefore, the maximum financial benefit for the average 
patient—in 2009 was 159.46 euro which is only slightly 
higher than the mandatory deductible in that year. The num-
ber of patients who opted for a voluntary deductible is in 
fact negligible (less than 2%). On average, the patients in the 
2009 study sample left 22% of the total deductible unused 
in the year prior to the experiment resulting in an average 
expected financial benefit of 36.84 euro that one would miss 
out when visiting a non-preferred provider. However, there 
is significant variation across individual patients.
Model specifications
We estimate two model specifications: model A and model B. 
In addition to preferred provider status and price, the explan-
atory variables in both models include travel time, located in 
Friesland and type of provider to capture dimensions of pro-
vider heterogeneity that may have affected patient provider 
choice. The difference between both models is that model 
15 If there are varicose veins in both legs that require treatment, these 
treatments are almost always registered as separate claims and per-
formed on different dates. Nearly one-third of the patients in our sam-
ple required more than one treatment during a calendar year. In these 
cases, switching provider for the next treatment is rare (less than 5 
percent in our sample).
16 The fourth provider designated as preferred provider by DFZ, a 
general hospital located relatively far away, was not included because 
none of the Frisian patients with DFZ insurance visited this provider 
in the study period.
17 Compared to the overall Dutch population females and elderly are 
overrepresented among the varicose veins patients.
 S. A. van der Geest, M. Varkevisser 
1 3
Fig. 1  Location of providers included in the study
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of 
patient study sample
a Proportion of patients in 2008 visiting a provider that would be designated as preferred provider in 2009
2008
n = 2123
2009
n = 2129
Mean Std. dev Min Max Mean Std. dev Min Max
Age (years) 51 14 15 87 51 14 21 90
Social status − 0.54 1.17 − 7.25 2.94 − 0.48 1.13 − 5.49 3.19
Travel time (minutes) 24 39 0 455 25 39 0 455
Female 0.78 0 1 0.77 0 1
Age65+ 0.19 0 1 0.18 0 1
Located in Friesland 0.95 0 1 0.93 0 1
Type of provider
 ASC 0.03 0 1 0.06 0 1
 General hospital 0.61 0 1 0.57 0 1
 Tertiary hospital 0.36 0 1 0.37 0 1
Preferred provider 0.39a 0 1 0.42 0 1
Patient responsiveness to a differential deductible: empirical results from The Netherlands 
1 3
B allows both the effect of designating preferred providers 
and the financial channeling incentive to be heterogeneous 
among patient groups. These groups are identified using the 
few patient characteristics available in the dataset.
Goodness of fit
To measure the models’ goodness of fit, following Town and 
Vistnes [20], we construct a “hit-or-miss” criterion where 
predicted patient choice was the provider with the maxi-
mum predicted probability. Both model A and B correctly 
predict almost 8 out of every 10 patients’ provider choices, 
suggesting a high degree of explanatory power. In addition, 
we predict each provider j’s patient volume by summing up 
all patients’ estimated choice probabilities for provider j. 
Table 7 in the “Appendix” presents predicted patient volume 
for each individual provider using the two models. Notice 
that from this table it can be concluded that one of the pre-
ferred providers (UMC Groningen) apparently was not an 
attractive alternative for the patients included in the study 
sample; most likely because a university medical center typi-
cally focuses on top clinical and highly specialized care.
Estimated coefficients
Table 3 reports our patient choice model’s coefficient esti-
mates and standard errors. Consistent with the existing 
empirical literature on patient provider choice, we find that 
varicose veins patients had a strong preference for providers 
located nearby, all else equal. In both models, the coefficient 
of Time is highly significant and negative. An artificial 10% 
increase in travel time, all else equal, reduces a provider’s 
patient volume between 11 and 84% as minimum and maxi-
mum respectively. Related to this, patients also had a high 
propensity of selecting a provider located in the province 
Friesland, all else equal. Hence, they did not like to cross 
the regional border for treatment. Furthermore, patients were 
more likely to choose ambulatory surgery centers compared 
with general and tertiary hospitals, all else equal.
In model A the significant coefficient of Pref interacted 
with Post indicates that being designated as preferred pro-
vider by health insurer DFZ in 2009 was a positive incen-
tive for patients (p value = 0.02). Patients were more likely 
to visit those providers, all else equal. The coefficient of 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of 2009 patient study sample
2009
n = 2129
Mean Std. dev Min Max
Mandatory deductible in 2009 
(euros)
155.00 0.00 155.00 155.00
Voluntary deductible in 2009 
(euros)
4.46 39.54 0.00 500.00
Total deductible in 2009 (euros) 159.46 39.54 155.00 655.00
Deductible left unused in 2008 
(%)
22 36 0 100
Financial benefit of preferred 
provider choice (euros)
36.84 71.30 0 655.00
Table 3  Conditional logit 
estimates of patient choice
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
Variable Model A Model B
β Sig. SE β Sig. SE
Pref 0.612 0.341 0.610 0.341
Post × Pref 0.219 ** 0.094 − 0.080 0.174
Post × Pref × Age65+ − 0.217 0.187
Post × Pref × Female 0.487 *** 0.174
Post × Pref × Social status 0.139 ** 0.064
Price − 0.002 ** 0.001 − 0.000 0.001
Price × Age 65 + − 0.009 ** 0.003
Price × Female − 0.001 0.002
Price × Social status 0.000 0.001
Travel time − 0.128 *** 0.002 − 0.128 *** 0.002
Located in Friesland 1.676 *** 0.149 1.669 *** 0.149
Tertiary hospital − 0.246 0.337 − 0.249 0.338
ASC 3.580 *** 0.424 3.617 *** 0.424
N observations 55,276 55,276
N patients 4252 4252
Correct predicted (%) 79 79
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Pref is not statistically significant (p value = 0.07). Hence, 
it is not particularly apparent that patients had a pre-existing 
preference for providers that were designated as preferred 
provider in 2009. The negative sign found for the signifi-
cant coefficient on Price in model A indicates that the finan-
cial channeling incentive affected patient provider choice 
in the expected direction (p value = 0.04). The higher the 
price patients were expected to pay out-of-pocket, the less 
likely they were to seek care from a non-preferred provider. 
However, in contrast to the other provider attributes, patients 
were relatively insensitive to the financial benefit of visiting 
a preferred provider.
Despite the absence of an overall effect (i.e. for the “aver-
age” patient), the interaction variables in model B—captur-
ing any differences in preferences across types of patients—
suggest a statistically significant effect for females and social 
status with respect to the effect of the preferred provider sta-
tus on patient choice.18 The estimates indicate that females 
were more responsive to the preferred provider status than 
males. The same seems to hold for patients with a higher 
social status, which might reflect a higher cognitive ability 
to understand the channeling instrument. It might also relate 
to challenges faced by patients with a lower social status. For 
example, a reliance on public transportation would make 
travelling to a distant preferred provider more difficult for 
them. The significant coefficient on Price interacted with 
Age65+ suggests that retired patients were more sensitive to 
the financial channeling incentive than their younger coun-
terparts (p value = 0.01). It looks like the retired patient 
group—or the relatively healthy subpopulation in this 
group—took notice of the provided channeling incentive as 
well as expected themselves, based on their out-of-pocket 
payment in 2008, to benefit financially when choosing one 
of the preferred providers in 2009.
Cross‑price elasticity of demand
We conduct a simulation analysis for examining patients’ 
responsiveness to hypothetical changes in the cost-sharing 
rate.19 Using model B we simulate the impact of a twofold 
increase in patients’ 2009 total deductible on patient volume. 
Following our proxy for patient’s i expectations about his 
(potential) financial benefit, a twofold higher total deductible 
equals a doubling of the patient’s maximum price of a non-
preferred provider. For the average patient this corresponds 
to a maximum financial benefit of about 320 euro. Using 
the conditional logit estimates from Table 3, we recalcu-
lated each patient’s choice probabilities for all individual 
providers when the hypothetical increase in deductible 
would apply. After summing up these probabilities at the 
provider level, the percentage change in predicted patient 
volume for the preferred providers is divided by the percent-
age change of the deductible. Table 4 presents the results 
of this simulation analysis. Based on the estimated coeffi-
cients, the hypothesized larger cost-sharing difference across 
preferred and non-preferred providers would increase the 
predicted number of patients visiting the three preferred 
providers by 2.4 percent. Hence, the mean cross-price elas-
ticity of demand equals 0.02 ( SE = 0.00).20 As a robust-
ness check, we also performed the simulation analysis in 
two alternative ways. First, for the three patient subgroups 
separately (retired, female, lowest social status) the mean 
cross-price elasticities are found to be 0.05 (n = 153), 0.02 
(n = 727), and 0.02 (n = 537), respectively. So, as follows 
from model B’s coefficients, the retired patient group seems 
slightly more responsive to the channeling instrument. Sec-
ond, when using model A rather than model B the mean 
cross-price elasticity of demand also equals 0.02 (n = 899). 
Hence, including interaction terms does not change this 
elasticity.
Who really benefited?
Another look at the data confirms the limited impact of 
the cost-sharing differential itself. In 2009, from the 2129 
patients 42% chose one of the preferred providers. Based 
on their out-of-pockets payments in 2008, a total of 655 
Table 4  Estimated cross-price elasticity of demand (price of non-pre-
ferred providers + 100%)
a For the parametric bootstrap we use the Krinsky–Robb method [12, 
13]
Provider Predicted 
patient 
volume
Mean SE 95% 
confidence 
based on 
parametric 
 bootstrapa
MC Leeuwarden 795 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.02
Braamkliniek 98 0.03 0.000 0.02 0.03
UMC Groningen 6 0.07 0.001 0.06 0.07
Preferred providers 899 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.02
18 Please note that when included in non-linear models the coeffi-
cients of interaction terms must be interpreted carefully [11].
19 This approach is commonly used in the hospital choice literature; 
e.g. Varkevisser et al. [22, 23], Beukers et al. [1], and Gutacker et al. 
[8].
20 The standard error is computed to test for the robustness of our 
findings. We used the vector of estimated parameters and correspond-
ing covariance matrix from our conditional logit model to randomly 
draw 1000 sets of alternative, equally probable model parameters 
from a multivariate normal distribution with this vector and matrix as 
means and covariance, respectively.
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patients (31%) was expected to benefit from the difference 
in cost-sharing across the two tiers of providers (Table 5). 
This group includes all patients who did not fully use their 
deductible in the year preceding the channeling experiment. 
From them, 274 patients (42%) indeed selected a preferred 
provider for their treatment in 2009. The remaining 381 
patients (58%), for whatever reason, during the channeling 
experiment did not respond to their prior end-of-the-year 
marginal price.
Using the data that DFZ provided us on out-of-pocket 
payments in 2009, additional calculations reveal that only 
19% of the 899 patients who during the channeling experi-
ment selected a preferred provider did actually enjoy a finan-
cial benefit. For them this benefit was on average almost 
100 euro. For the remaining patients the costs of medical 
services other than treatment for varicose veins were so high 
that they still had to pay their full deductible. Hence, the 
overwhelming majority of patients (81%) choosing to visit a 
preferred provider at the end of the year was not financially 
rewarded for doing so.
Conclusion
Health insurers offering managed care plans may use finan-
cial incentives for channeling patients to preferred providers 
with lower costs and/or higher quality. Empirical evidence 
whether differences in cost-sharing rates across providers 
impacts patient choice behavior is emerging but, especially 
from European countries, still limited. This paper examined 
a Dutch insurer’s channeling experiment with a differen-
tial deductible to steer patient provider choice in a regional 
market for varicose veins treatment. During the experiment, 
the insurer waived patients’ deductible when they chose to 
visit a preferred provider for medical treatment. Since the 
exemption was conditional on the patient’s other medical 
expenses occurring in the policy year, people had to make a 
prediction about the ‘price’ associated with visiting a non-
preferred provider.
Using data covering the year of the experiment and 1 year 
before, we estimated a conditional logit model of patient 
choice. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, the estimation results indicate that, independent of 
their expected financial benefit imposed by the differential 
deductible, patients were more likely to choose a preferred 
provider than a non-preferred provider. In the year preced-
ing the experiment, a clear preference for these providers 
was not observed. This suggests that the insurer succeeded 
in convincing a considerable number of patients of the pre-
ferred providers’ better than average performances on guide-
line adherence, waiting time and patient satisfaction.
Second, the estimation results suggest that varicose veins 
patients were less likely to select a non-preferred provider 
when this, based om their percentage use of deductible in 
2008, was associated with a higher expected out-of-pocket 
payment. The average cross-price elasticity of demand is 
estimated to be 0.02, indicating that patient responsiveness 
to the cost-sharing differential itself was low.21
To conclude, our finding that patient demand for the 
preferred providers is rather insensitive to an increase in 
price of the non-preferred providers may be related to the 
relatively short length of the experiment. By canceling it 
already after the first year, the insurer ruled out the possibil-
ity that more enrollees learned about the financial incentive 
in later years. The channeling experiment lasted only 1 year 
because, according to the insurer, enrollees reacted nega-
tively towards the use of a differential deductible to influ-
ence patient choice. Furthermore, it seems likely that the 
design of the financial incentive contributed substantially 
to a low patient responsiveness. Unlike a fixed cost-sharing 
differential between preferred and non-preferred providers 
the deductible exemption studied here was conditional on 
the patient’s other medical expenses occurring in the policy 
year. Most patients were, therefore, uncertain about their 
financial benefit of choosing a preferred provider making ex 
ante price comparison very difficult. On the other hand, the 
financial incentive was irrelevant for chronically ill patients 
because they will for sure meet their deductible within the 
year and thus do not have any incentive to respond to this 
channeling experiment.
Reducing the annual deductible when enrollees seek care 
at a preferred provider instead of waiving it only for that 
treatment might be a more effective financial incentive for 
patient channeling. However, it would also be more costly 
to insurers and causing a potential moral hazard effect on 
Table 5  Number of patients by provider choice in 2009 and expected 
financial benefit of preferred provider choice
Provider choice in 2009 Expected financial benefit: Total
> €0–€155 > €155–€655
Preferred provider 258 16 274
Non-preferred provider 370 11 381
Total 628 27 655
21 As pointed out by one of the reviewers, our study does not take 
into account that some patients requiring varicose vein treatment may 
forego treatment or switch to a different treatment rather than receive 
a (potentially) higher-cost procedure from a non-preferred provider. 
In theory, such substitution might indeed be relevant for patients who 
would choose to receive care from a non-preferred provider absent 
the tiering scheme. However, in practice the deductible—which 
underlies the potential price difference between preferred and non-
preferred providers—is in The Netherlands not associated with unmet 
need for financial reasons [15].
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the use of other medical services. Moreover, a first prereq-
uisite for a differential deductible to work as intended is 
that patients understand the concept of a deductible com-
pared to their amount of medical spending. This is, as clearly 
illustrated by Handel and Kolstad [9], not straightforward. 
When attempting to steer patients to preferred providers, 
we, therefore, expect insurers to be more successful using 
other types of cost-sharing differentials by provider tier, for 
example, making a cost-sharing distinction for co-payments, 
co-insurance or the out-of-pocket maximum. This provides 
patients with a financial incentive that is both easy to under-
stand and associated with a guaranteed financial benefit.
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Appendix
See Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6  Provider attributes
a ASC ambulatory surgery center, GH general hospital, TH tertiary hospital
Provider name City Province Typea Preferred 
provider
1 MC Leeuwarden Leeuwarden Friesland TH Yes
2 Ziekenhuis Nij Smellinghe Drachten Friesland GH No
3 Antonius ziekenhuis Sneek Friesland GH No
4 Ziekenhuis De Tjongerschans Heerenveen Friesland GH No
5 Talma Sionsberg Dokkum Friesland GH No
6 Braamkliniek Assen Drenthe ASC Yes
7 Wilhelmina ziekenhuis Assen Drenthe GH No
8 UMC Groningen Groningen Groningen TH Yes
9 IJsselmeer ziekenhuis Noordoostpolder Flevoland GH No
10 Flebologisch centrum Oosterwal Alkmaar N-Holland ASC No
11 Martini ziekenhuis Groningen Groningen TH No
12 Refaja ziekenhuis Stadskanaal Groningen GH No
13 Zorgcombinatie Noorderboog Meppel Drenthe GH No
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